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Gone but not forgotten: the (re-)making of diaspora strategies
Yu-Wen Chena*, Emilie Racinea and Neil Collinsb
aDepartment of Government, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland; bGraduate School of Public
Policy, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
This review article summarises the literature on the relations between states and their
diaspora. Policy-makers are struggling to know how best to respond to and possibly
harness the potential of kindred communities abroad. The article outlines a wide
spectrum of policy initiatives and categorises them into three groups: economic,
political and socio-cultural. Five economic, four political and two socio-cultural factors
are discussed as are a wide variety of implementation strategies evident in different
jurisdictions. Though the focus is on Asia, examples have been chosen from locations
worldwide. Academically, the article identifies the empirical and conceptual deficien-
cies in studies on diaspora strategies.
Keywords: diaspora strategies; neoliberalism; economic factors; political factors;
socio-cultural factors
Introduction
In this review article, we summarise academic discussions of the economic, political and
socio-cultural conditions that have driven countries around the world to craft or modify
their diaspora relationships and strategies. In recent years, there has been a significant
intensification of interest in relations between states and their diaspora. This renewed
interest is not solely academic and has coincided with the concerns of policy-makers, who
are increasingly expected to understand and address issues arising from a world that is
being transformed by migration. September 2006 marked an important point in the
evolution of the research and policy with the scheduling of a United Nations High-
Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD). Diaspora engage-
ment is now very much in vogue.1 The sending and receiving countries, as well as
international entities such as the World Bank or the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM),2 are all looking for the best way to respond to and possibly harness
the potential of the world’s diaspora communities.
Diaspora strategies are defined as policy initiatives aimed at fostering and managing
relationships with a diaspora.3 They can vary from highly formalised and structured
programmes to projects that are quite light in conception and application. In recent
years, scholars have created a variety of classifications of diaspora strategies. Chander
devised a straightforward classification: economic, political and cultural policy.4 Barry
distinguishes between legal, economic and political instruments.5 Gamlen focusses on
community building policies and mechanisms extending membership privileges and
obligations.6
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Kalm uses the notion of governmentality as a theoretical framework to understand
governmental approaches to emigration and diaspora strategies as a whole.7 The theory of
governmentality, first propounded by French philosopher Michael Foucault and subse-
quently elaborated by Barbara Cruikshank and Nikolas Rose, essentially describes the
strategic and calculated acts of governments to facilitate certain human conducts.8 Kalm
argues that diaspora policies aim to promote a specific model of citizenship that is
supposed to produce ‘the mobile entrepreneurial and flexible emigrant citizen’ on the
one hand but holds the constant expectation that emigrants should continue to identify
with and remain loyal to their home country on the other.9
It is widely acknowledged that diaspora policy has increasingly taken a neoliberal turn
with migration being seen as a possible tool for development and the ‘movement of
people is understood as potentially conducive to development’.10 Larner notes that
In the policy documents of a myriad of international organisations, national governments and
economic development agencies, diaspora strategies are now an integral part of a govern-
mental imaginary in which entrepreneurial, globally networked, subjects create new possibi-
lities for economic growth and in doing so contribute to the development of a knowledge
based economy.11
Taking into consideration the limitations of using the notion of governmentality and the
ideology of neoliberalism as tools for understanding diaspora strategies, it is crucial for
governments and other policy networks to take into account the rights and requirements of
the diaspora. This can be done by fostering a mutually beneficial relationship between a
state and its diaspora. While sending countries are quick to call for their expatriate
populations’ economic and political contribution to the development of their country of
origin, it is clear that most expatriates and their representative organisations expect this to
be a two-way deal. Similarly, Lowell and Gerova point out that ‘striking the right balance
between a sending country’s engagement in making use of its expatriate communities and
the wishes and needs of such communities has yet to be found’.12
In the following three sections, we provide a categorisation of the various factors that
prompt states to foster different diaspora strategies. Although some factors are related to
one another, we still categorise them into three broad groups: economic, political and
socio-cultural. As we discuss these factors, we will give relevant empirical examples, and
such cases are not limited to Asian countries and diaspora groups. It is expected that a
global comparative perspective will help readers to understand the nature of the growing
interest in diaspora policies academically and practically in various corners of the world.
In the conclusion, we will address the current empirical and conceptual deficiencies in the
field that should be taken into account in future endeavours.
Economic factors
There has been a growing awareness of the number of ways in which diaspora commu-
nities can contribute to home states’ economic development. Here we discern five
economic factors driving states to engage with their diaspora: foreign direct investment
(FDI), access to foreign markets, creating business networks, encouraging return migra-
tion and source of foreign currency.
Regarding FDI and other resources, it is believed that expatriates hold crucial knowl-
edge of the business environment of their home country. This leads their home govern-
ments to improve the conditions for diaspora’s homeward investment.13 Vietnam’s
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‘renovation policy’ in 1986 and other favourable policies created since the 2000s, for
example, have aimed to entice overseas Vietnamese investment.14 Apart from Vietnam,
China, India, Ireland, New Zealand, Latin America and the Caribbean countries also have
initiatives to encourage their diaspora to contribute to the investment and development of
their home states.15
The second economic incentive for governments is the possibility to access foreign
markets via diaspora. Lowell and Gerova have highlighted ‘nostalgic trade’ as an impor-
tant export market, where emigrants purchase goods from home in order to somehow feel
close to their homeland.16 Gutiérrez maintains that one of the reasons why the Mexican
government fosters a close relationship with its diaspora in the United States is that they
constitute an ‘extraordinary market for exports of Mexican products’.17 Corona beer,
originally made in Mexico, is America’s ninth best-selling beer and known all over the
world. Initially the Mexican community in the United States used to buy Corona, and then
it underwent a significant crossover from the diaspora market to the native-born US
citizen market.18
Cohen also emphasises the importance of this factor as he discusses the overseas
market for exports created by the Chinese diaspora.19 Chinese migrant traders have not
necessarily assimilated into their countries of residence and instead have remained loyal to
potential business opportunities and profitable arrangements, by targeting the Chinese
migrant market. Cohen notes that ‘at the global level, the overseas Chinese represent a
formidable economic network, exceeding in wealth the GNP’s of all but the most power-
ful nation states’.20
The third economic factor that prompts states to develop diaspora strategy is the
possibility to create and expand business networks via diaspora. Diasporas usually form
networks that allow the circulation of knowledge, skills, capital and information. This
then enables the easy transfer of business, manufacturing and finance opportunities.21
The circulation of knowledge might not be directly related to business. But various
scholars have noted how China encourages its diaspora to transfer scientific knowledge
back to China, with the aim of boosting the research and development (R&D) environ-
ment at home. China is doing this in the hope to modernise itself and become more
competitive in domestic and international markets.22
The fourth economic incentive is the possibility that the diaspora returning home
would contribute to the economic performance of the home country. Return migration was
the primary feature of the world’s first diaspora strategies in the 1960s and some countries
still place a heavy emphasis on the importance of return migration, particularly those that
wish to move up the development ladder. For example, in 1993, Jamaica established a
Charter for Long-Term Returning Residents, a programme that reduced costs for retur-
nees. The Charter later became known as the Returning Resident Facilitation Unit, which
became a government department in 1998. In 2002, a Minister for Diaspora Affairs was
appointed, illustrating the significant evolution of Jamaica’s Diaspora Policy.23
The last economic factor concerns remittances, which are often an invaluable source
of income and foreign exchange earnings for a country.24 Ratha notes that remittances are
less volatile than private capital flows and often rise during recessions, helping to
stimulate vulnerable economies.25
Gutiérrez has highlighted the importance of the Mexican diaspora in the United States
as an important source of foreign currency through the remittances that migrant workers
send to their families in Mexico.26 In the Cuban context, the Cuban-American community
accounts for 68% of total remittances sent to Cuba. US Cubans send on average eight
remittances a year, at an average of about US$150 per remittance.
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As an incentive to such payments, various governments encourage a streamlined and
cost-effective remittance process.27 For example, in 2006, India launched the Remittance
Gateway system. This allows the Indian diaspora to send money to 14,500 locations in
India at a far lower cost than commercial money wire companies.
While economic incentives are driving states to strengthen ties with diaspora, Lowell
and Gerova argue that there is ‘far too little known about the various mechanisms that
may foster successful development in the wake of returning migrants’28 and, therefore,
many academics have been incorrectly assuming that return migration has a positive effect
on the development of the home state.
For instance, using data from an original survey of 174 foreign-owned companies in
Georgia, Graham found no evidence that diaspora-owned firms would demonstrate a
specific set of ‘socially responsible, pro-development’ behaviours than other foreign
companies in Georgia.29 Similarly, Chen shows that even China’s hope to use diaspora
to modernise the country are hindered by the unregulated, risk-averse and bureaucratic
environment as well as the lack of experience in integrating R&D and commercialisation
in China.30
Political factors
Political factors can also prompt different states to implement certain strategies over
others. Here we discern four political factors pertaining to expatriate voting, political
lobbying, foreign policy objectives and the nature of a state’s institutions in handling
diaspora affairs.
First of all, the right to vote from abroad is a crucial factor that leads states to foster
particular strategies with their diaspora. Expatriate voting allows migrants to assert
membership of the political community and take part in efforts to produce policy changes
in their home countries. By voting, migrants assert identification with their home country
regardless of the caveat that migrants often have a voting agenda reflecting their own
interests and experiences, which in turn can produce conflict.31
Electoral systems are increasingly allowing emigrants to vote from abroad with over
100 countries permitting expatriate voting. In 1988, for instance, when the Mexican
government allowed its diaspora to vote, presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas,
who had been expelled from the dominant Party of the Democratic Revolution, looked for
support in the United States.32
Expatriate voting suggests that emigration ‘does not disrupt the bonds of nation-
hood’.33 It is of particular interest to legal scholars, political scientists and others as it
stands as an important symbol of the world’s transnational community. This being said, it
can also threaten host society’s acceptance of the migrants for fear that immigrants
represent a Trojan horse loyal to foreign people and states.34
In addition, Kalm suggests that some states hesitate to allow expatriates to vote as they
essentially fail on two of the key elements that are required for participation in the
democratic system.35 The first of these is sufficient knowledge of the political context
and the second is behaving responsibly at the ballot. The absence of these two elements
means ‘extending voting rights is probably the most controversial among the diaspora
strategies’.36
Second, political lobby groups might also push states to foster diaspora strategies. For
example, emigrants, either individually or as part of a collective lobbying group, may look
to their home governments for support in their struggle for rights against discrimination in
the labour market.
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The diaspora may also be expected by their home government to represent their
country abroad and be good ambassadors. Øestergaard-Nielsen affirms that ‘if migrants
are expected to be good representatives and do some lobbying for their country of origin
abroad, then they would often like some influence on the policies that they are expected to
represent’.37
The third political factor pertains to some states’ interests in pursuing certain foreign
policy strategies. For instance, Russia has used its diaspora to ‘bolster the Russian
Federation as a great power and to underscore Russia’s special foreign policy role
throughout the former Soviet Union’.38 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) is another interesting case in point. As the TRNC is not internationally recog-
nised as a sovereign state, it has exploited its diaspora’s international networks to help
overcome its international isolation. The international activism of Turkish Cypriots
exhibits a kind of defensive transnationalisation that counterbalances the international
actions of Greek Cypriots to de-legitimise TRNC.39
The last factor that affects how and why states to engage with their diaspora is the
nature of government and history of institutions. For some countries, diaspora policy is a
relatively new area of interest. This has meant that many agencies and institutions are
relatively young. For example, until recently the Armenian government lacked the
necessary resources needed to harness the potential of its diaspora. However, in 2000, a
series of conferences between the government and the diaspora were organised in order to
gain more knowledge on the state of diaspora affairs. The new Ministry for Diaspora
Affairs was set up in 2008, and the ‘Armenia 2020 Strategy’ was devised. This strategy
promotes inward investment through the Armenian Development Agency and the globa-
lisation of indigenous firms through Armentech, an association of high-tech professionals
of Armenian lineage. The establishment of a well-informed relationship in the early
conferences has proved to work successfully for both willing diaspora groups and the
home state.40
Socio-cultural factors
We discern two socio-cultural factors that have been widely discussed to have affected
states’ formulation of diaspora policies: moral obligations and reputation of home country
abroad as well as diaspora identity.
Often a country can be under pressure to engage with its diaspora for moral reasons or
can be forced to do so by the diaspora’s host country.41 The home country feels compelled
to deal with its diaspora in this regard because its diaspora often serves as a country’s
permanent ambassadors abroad. Its diaspora’s conduct in a foreign country will affect the
home state’s image abroad. More often than not, these moral reasons will be linked to the
legal status of its citizens in host states and depends upon ‘the extent to which the diaspora
is creating a potential embarrassing situation because of “illegals” or “undocumented
immigrants” in the country of adoption’.42
Another socio-cultural factor contributing to how and why states engage with their
diasporas is to promote a certain diasporic identity among its emigrants and a sense of still
belonging to their homeland. Gutiérrez describes in depth the traditional relationship
between Mexico and its diaspora in America in which the home state looked upon its
emigrants as traitors and failures. He describes the Mexican government depicting its
emigrants as ‘pochos’, meaning spoiled or over-ripe. He also discusses the characterisa-
tion of Mexican-Americans in Mexican cinema in which the characters typically lose their
own identity and all connections with their homeland when attempting to assimilate into
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American society. Since the 1970s, however, various governmental agencies of Mexico
have been working to improve its relationship with the diaspora in America.43 Indeed,
what was behind the Mexican government’s motivation is not purely socio-cultural. There
are also political and economic calculations involved as highlighted in previous sections.
But the hope of fostering the diaspora’s identification with its home is one of the driving
forces.
Conclusions
Despite the re-emerging interests in diaspora strategies among governments, the admin-
istration process of such policies and programmes remains a critical concern. Some
planned policy outcomes are being thwarted by ineffective implementation. In some
countries, the implementation of a strategy is coordinated through a single or principal
government agency, such as India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Armenia’s
Ministry of Diaspora and Jamaica’s Diaspora and Consular Affairs Department in the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade.44 In 2010, the IOM carried out a specific review
on government institutional structures in relation to diaspora engagement. The study
found that there are 43 countries with either ministry-level or sub-ministry-level diaspora
institutions.45 Elsewhere, there is no single agency that coordinates policy but a plethora
of organisations are involved in handling diaspora affairs. Scotland and Ireland fall into
this category.46
With regard to Asian countries and their diasporas in particular, there are empirical
studies on India, China, Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, on Vietnam. But there is an
obvious knowledge gap in what is going on in other Asian countries and their relationship
with their diasporas.
Another caveat that has been raised by scholars working on diaspora in general is the
neo-liberal approach to crafting diaspora strategies, making these policies elite-oriented
and only targeted at the business and scientific communities. This is particularly apparent
when gaining economic incentives is a home country’s motive.
In a lot of the discourses presented by nation-states to foster diasporic relationships,
loyalty and national identity are emphasised. For instance, Chinese diaspora are encour-
aged to ‘serve the country’ by solving the brain drain in China.47 While this kind of
discourse would revive national identification among certain Chinese diaspora, it neglects
those originating from China that may not be interested in this kind of ‘nationalist’
projects. The dynamic between the Chinese state and those who are not the targeted
‘diaspora’ is thus unspecified in current literature.
Take Tibetans and Uyghurs for example. China’s relationship with these two diaspora
groups has tended to be examined in a different category of academic literature.48
Confrontation is the predominant theme in their interactions.49 In terms of policy-making,
there is a lack of discussion of China’s diaspora strategies in handling relationships with
Tibetans and Uyghurs abroad. Academically, there is also a black hole of unspecified
concepts with regard to how such kind of relationship can be theorised in literature on
diaspora strategies.
In a similar vein, Mani and Varadarajan point out that the Indian state’s diaspora
strategies do not concern diaspora who were expelled from India when Pakistan and
Bangladesh, both primarily Muslim societies, sought independence. Hence, Hindu
national identity is embedded in India’s crafting of diasporic strategies, which is in
contrast to the secular Indian state’s claim to multiculturalism.50 There should be more
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efforts in filling the aforementioned empirical and conceptual deficiencies in the studies
on diaspora strategies.
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